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All Contested Case Subject
Administrative Procedures Act
In General
An agency must follow its own rules that it has adopted. Guillen, Mary,
16 CCHR 208 (2011).
WCD not required to include notice of right to request reconsideration or inform parties that requesting hearing may bar admission of new medical evidence in notice of appeal rights on administrative orders. Rice, Jeremy E.,
15 CCHR 89 (2010).
Temporary rule OAR 436-009-0040(1) was a valid rule that did not exceed the authority granted the director by ORS 656.248 to regulate payment of medical services, but retroactive application of the rule would violate the180-day time limit under ORS 183.335(6). Back In Action Physical Therapy*,
15 CCHR 52 (2010).
ORS 183.415(2) and (3) do not apply to the functions of DCBS under ORS 654 and 656, thus the director's order gave proper notice of the right to a hearing. Rice, Jeremy E.*,
15 CCHR 41 (2010).
When a director's order is amended to correct a typographical error but does not otherwise change the original order, an appeal of the original order will be treated as an appeal of that order as amended. Dorcy, Tommy H*,
11 CCHR 310 (2006).
An agency is not required to specifically state every subsection to each and every administrative rule and statutory provision that will apply during a contested case proceeding. Robuck, Richard E,
11 CCHR 50 (2006).
Strict compliance with procedural rules by an out-of-state physician may be waived by the director where the insurer fails to inform the physician of the requirements of the rules. Little, Dianne,
8 CCHR 369 (2003).
Claimant's motion to dismiss insurer's contention regarding causation is granted because insurer failed to raise it before MRU. Santa Maria, Pedro*,
8 CCHR 330 (2003).
The ALJ acted properly in response to the agency's request for a further hearing, and administrative notice is taken of the administrative order issued after the hearing. Massingale, Frank A.*,
8 CCHR 216 (2003).
When a party is notified of the time and place of a hearing and fails to appear for reasons not beyond the party's reasonable control, an adverse order may be entered upon the prima facie case on the record. Olsen, Cristine O.*,
8 CCHR 123 (2003).
When a party is notified of the time and place of a hearing and fails to appear for reasons not beyond party's reasonable control, an adverse order may be entered upon prima facie case on the record. Spikes, Corey,
8 CCHR 109 (2003).
The director has the discretion to not adopt a rule setting standards for changing vocational assistance providers. Brown, Richard M.,
8 CCHR 52 (2003).
Because the insurer was notified by certified mail of the hearing date, it failed to appear at the hearing, and it offered no explanation of circumstances beyond its control, the default order is appropriate. Faust, Ronald C.*,
8 CCHR 40 (2003).
Director's order republished on insurer's Petition for Reconsideration and Request for Stay pursuant to OAR 137-003-0675. Ainsworth, Jacqueline C.,
8 CCHR 23 (2003).
Insurer entitled to judgment as a matter of law under OAR 137-003-0580. Buell, Kenneth E.,
8 CCHR 15 (2003).
Validity of Rules
Where a statute and rule address the same issue and conflict in their requirements, the statute is controlling. Meier, William*,
16 CCHR 260 (2011).
Enforcing fee discount contracts between medical providers and insurers under OAR 436-009-0040 does not violate the exclusive remedy principle of workers' compensation law. Impact Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 236 (2011).
An administrative order that is issued after a temporary rule expires cannot rely on the expired rule. Impact Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 236 (2011).
Enforcing fee discount contracts between medical providers and insurers under OAR 436-009-0040 does not violate the exclusive remedy principle of workers' compensation law. Laurelhurst Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 243 (2011).
An administrative order that is issued after a temporary rule expires cannot rely on the expired rule. Laurelhurst Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 243 (2011).
Enforcing fee discount contracts between medical providers and insurers under OAR 436-009-0040 does not violate the exclusive remedy principle of workers' compensation law. Therapeutic Associates, Inc.*,
16 CCHR 250 (2011).
An administrative order that is issued after a temporary rule expires cannot rely on the expired rule. Therapeutic Associates, Inc.*,
16 CCHR 250 (2011).
Enforcing fee discount contracts between medical providers and insurers under OAR 436-009-0040 does not violate the exclusive remedy principle of workers' compensation law. Erhardt Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 229 (2011).
An administrative order that is issued after a temporary rule expires cannot rely on the expired rule. Erhardt Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 229 (2011).
Enforcing fee discount contracts between medical providers and insurers under OAR 436-009-0040 does not violate the exclusive remedy principle of workers' compensation law. Chehalem Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 222 (2011).
An administrative order that is issued after a temporary rule expires cannot rely on the expired rule. Chehalem Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 222 (2011).
Article I, Section 20 of the Oregon Constitution prohibits an agency from adopting a rule that grants a benefit to one class of citizens that is not granted to all citizens. Guillen, Mary,
16 CCHR 208 (2011).
OAR 436-009-0125, which prohibits interpreters from charging for missed appointments, is not inherently unfair because interpreters can account for this cost through their usual charges. Guillen, Mary,
16 CCHR 208 (2011).
OAR 436-009-0125, prohibiting interpreters from charging for missed appointments, does not violate Article I, Section 20 of the Oregon Constitution by improperly granting a benefit to one class that is denied to another class. Guillen, Mary,
16 CCHR 208 (2011).
Enforcing fee discount contracts between medical providers and insurers under OAR 436-009-0040 does not violate the exclusive remedy principle of workers' compensation law. Erhardt Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 128 (2011).
An administrative order that is issued after a temporary rule expires cannot rely on the expired rule. Erhardt Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 128 (2011).
It was within the director's authority to adopt former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 authorizing the use of medical fee payment discount contracts because it is consistent with the language of the authorizing statutes, ORS 656.012, 656.248, 656.726. Jackson County Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 135 (2011).
Former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 can validly be applied retroactively because its language expressly makes it retroactive and doing so does not prejudicially impair pre-existing rights. Jackson County Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 135 (2011).
Applying a temporary rule retroactively did not invalidate the rule by extending its effect beyond the permitted 180 days because the rule was applied to a dispute that was resolved while the rule was in effect. Jackson County Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 135 (2011).
It was within the director's authority to adopt former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 authorizing the use of medical fee payment discount contracts because it is consistent with the language of the authorizing statutes, ORS 656.012, 656.248, 656.726. Capitol Physical and Hand Therapy*,
16 CCHR 145 (2011).
Former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 can validly be applied retroactively because its language expressly makes it retroactive and doing so does not prejudicially impair pre-existing rights. Capitol Physical and Hand Therapy*,
16 CCHR 145 (2011).
Applying a temporary rule retroactively did not invalidate the rule by extending its effect beyond the permitted 180 days because the rule was applied to a dispute that was resolved while the rule was in effect. Capitol Physical and Hand Therapy*,
16 CCHR 145 (2011).
Enforcing fee discount contracts between medical providers and insurers under OAR 436-009-0040 does not violate the exclusive remedy principle of workers' compensation law. Laurelhurst Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 107 (2011).
An administrative order that is issued after a temporary rule expires cannot rely on the expired rule. Laurelhurst Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 107 (2011).
It was within the director's authority to adopt former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 authorizing the use of medical fee payment discount contracts because it is consistent with the language of the authorizing statutes, ORS 656.012, 656.248, 656.726. ProActive Orthopedic of Oregon City*,
16 CCHR 161 (2011).
Former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 can validly be applied retroactively because its language expressly makes it retroactive and doing so does not prejudicially impair pre-existing rights. ProActive Orthopedic of Oregon City*,
16 CCHR 161 (2011).
Applying a temporary rule retroactively did not invalidate the rule by extending its effect beyond the permitted 180 days because the rule was applied to a dispute that was resolved while the rule was in effect. ProActive Orthopedic of Oregon City*,
16 CCHR 161 (2011).
Enforcing fee discount contracts between medical providers and insurers under OAR 436-009-0040 does not violate the exclusive remedy principle of workers' compensation law. Therapeutic Associates, Inc.*,
16 CCHR 121 (2011).
An administrative order that is issued after a temporary rule expires cannot rely on the expired rule. Therapeutic Associates, Inc.*,
16 CCHR 121 (2011).
Enforcing fee discount contracts between medical providers and insurers under OAR 436-009-0040 does not violate the exclusive remedy principle of workers' compensation law. Cascade Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 114 (2011).
An administrative order that is issued after a temporary rule expires cannot rely on the expired rule. Cascade Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 114 (2011).
It was within the director's authority to adopt former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 authorizing the use of medical fee payment discount contracts because it is consistent with the language of the authorizing statutes, ORS 656.012, 656.248, 656.726. Laurelhurst Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 153 (2011).
Former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 can validly be applied retroactively because its language expressly makes it retroactive and doing so does not prejudicially impair pre-existing rights. Laurelhurst Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 153 (2011).
Applying a temporary rule retroactively did not invalidate the rule by extending its effect beyond the permitted 180 days because the rule was applied to a dispute that was resolved while the rule was in effect. Laurelhurst Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 153 (2011).
It was within the director's authority to adopt former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 authorizing the use of medical fee payment discount contracts because it is consistent with the language of the authorizing statutes, ORS 656.012, 656.248, 656.726. ProActive Orthopedic of Gresham*,
16 CCHR 169 (2011).
Former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 can validly be applied retroactively because its language expressly makes it retroactive and doing so does not prejudicially impair pre-existing rights. ProActive Orthopedic of Gresham*,
16 CCHR 169 (2011).
Applying a temporary rule retroactively did not invalidate the rule by extending its effect beyond the permitted 180 days because the rule was applied to a dispute that was resolved while the rule was in effect. ProActive Orthopedic of Gresham*,
16 CCHR 169 (2011).
Enforcing fee discount contracts between medical providers and insurers under OAR 436-009-0040 does not violate the exclusive remedy principle of workers' compensation law. Impact Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 93 (2011).
An administrative order that is issued after a temporary rule expires cannot rely on the expired rule. Impact Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 93 (2011).
Enforcing fee discount contracts between medical providers and insurers under OAR 436-009-0040 does not violate the exclusive remedy principle of workers' compensation law. Chehalem Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 100 (2011).
An administrative order that is issued after a temporary rule expires cannot rely on the expired rule. Chehalem Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 100 (2011).
It was within the director's authority to adopt former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 authorizing the use of medical fee payment discount contracts because it is consistent with the language of the authorizing statutes, ORS 656.012, 656.248, 656.726. Umpqua Valley Physical Therapy,
16 CCHR 70 (2011).
Former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 can validly be applied retroactively because its language expressly makes it retroactive and doing so does not prejudicially impair pre-existing rights. Umpqua Valley Physical Therapy,
16 CCHR 70 (2011).
Applying a temporary rule retroactively did not invalidate the rule by extending its effect beyond the permitted 180 days because the rule was applied to a dispute that was resolved while the rule was in effect. Umpqua Valley Physical Therapy,
16 CCHR 70 (2011).
It was within the director's authority to adopt former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 authorizing the use of medical fee payment discount contracts because it is consistent with the language of the authorizing statutes, ORS 656.012, 656.248, 656.726. Tim Foley Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 42 (2011).
Former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 can validly be applied retroactively because its language expressly makes it retroactive and doing so does not prejudicially impair pre-existing rights. Tim Foley Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 42 (2011).
Applying a temporary rule retroactively did not invalidate the rule by extending its effect beyond the permitted 180 days because the rule was applied to a dispute that was resolved while the rule was in effect. Tim Foley Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 42 (2011).
It was within the director's authority to adopt former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 authorizing the use of medical fee payment discount contracts because it is consistent with the language of the authorizing statutes, ORS 656.012, 656.248, 656.726. Keizer Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 35 (2011).
Former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 can validly be applied retroactively because its language expressly makes it retroactive and doing so does not prejudicially impair pre-existing rights. Keizer Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 35 (2011).
Applying a temporary rule retroactively did not invalidate the rule by extending its effect beyond the permitted 180 days because the rule was applied to a dispute that was resolved while the rule was in effect. Keizer Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 35 (2011).
It was within the director's authority to adopt former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 authorizing the use of medical fee payment discount contracts because it is consistent with the language of the authorizing statutes, ORS 656.012, 656.248, 656.726. Canby Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 63 (2011).
Former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 can validly be applied retroactively because its language expressly makes it retroactive and doing so does not prejudicially impair pre-existing rights. Canby Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 63 (2011).
Applying a temporary rule retroactively did not invalidate the rule by extending its effect beyond the permitted 180 days because the rule was applied to a dispute that was resolved while the rule was in effect. Canby Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 63 (2011).
It was within the director's authority to adopt former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 authorizing the use of medical fee payment discount contracts because it is consistent with the language of the authorizing statutes, ORS 656.012, 656.248, 656.726. Zomerschoe Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 77 (2011).
Former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 can validly be applied retroactively because its language expressly makes it retroactive and doing so does not prejudicially impair pre-existing rights. Zomerschoe Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 77 (2011).
Applying a temporary rule retroactively did not invalidate the rule by extending its effect beyond the permitted 180 days because the rule was applied to a dispute that was resolved while the rule was in effect. Zomerschoe Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 77 (2011).
It was within the director's authority to adopt former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 authorizing the use of medical fee payment discount contracts because it is consistent with the language of the authorizing statutes, ORS 656.012, 656.248, 656.726. Clackamas Physical Therapy Associates*,
16 CCHR 49 (2011).
Former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 can validly be applied retroactively because its language expressly makes it retroactive and doing so does not prejudicially impair pre-existing rights. Clackamas Physical Therapy Associates*,
16 CCHR 49 (2011).
Applying a temporary rule retroactively did not invalidate the rule by extending its effect beyond the permitted 180 days because the rule was applied to a dispute that was resolved while the rule was in effect. Clackamas Physical Therapy Associates*,
16 CCHR 49 (2011).
It was within the director's authority to adopt former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 authorizing the use of medical fee payment discount contracts because it is consistent with the language of the authorizing statutes, ORS 656.012, 656.248, 656.726. Hood River Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 56 (2011).
Former temporary OAR 436-009-0040 can validly be applied retroactively because its language expressly makes it retroactive and doing so does not prejudicially impair pre-existing rights. Hood River Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 56 (2011).
Applying a temporary rule retroactively did not invalidate the rule by extending its effect beyond the permitted 180 days because the rule was applied to a dispute that was resolved while the rule was in effect. Hood River Physical Therapy*,
16 CCHR 56 (2011).
Temporary 436-009-0040 did not exceed the director's authority under ORS 656.248, but retroactive application of the rule created a conflict with the time limit for temporary rules in ORS 183.335(6)(a). Capitol Physical and Hand Therapy*,
15 CCHR 212 (2010).
OAR 436-009-0040, authorizing the use of discount contracts between medical providers and insurers was within the authority granted the division and therefore was valid. ProActive Orthopedic of Gresham*,
15 CCHR 291 (2010).
The temporary version of OAR 436-009-0040 could not be applied retroactively because doing so would extend the effective period of the rule beyond the permitted 180 days. ProActive Orthopedic of Gresham*,
15 CCHR 291 (2010).
Temporary 436-009-0040 did not exceed the director's authority under ORS 656.248, but retroactive application of the rule created a conflict with the time limit for temporary rules in ORS 183.335(6)(a). Proactive Orthopedic of Oregon City*,
15 CCHR 217 (2010).
Temporary 436-009-0040 did not exceed the director's authority under ORS 656.248, but retroactive application of the rule created a conflict with the time limit for temporary rules in ORS 183.335(6)(a). Jackson County Physical Therapy*,
15 CCHR 200 (2010).
Temporary 436-009-0040 did not exceed the director's authority under ORS 656.248, but retroactive application of the rule created a conflict with the time limit for temporary rules in ORS 183.335(6)(a). Laurelhurst Physical Therapy*,
15 CCHR 204 (2010).
Temporary 436-009-0040 did not exceed the director's authority under ORS 656.248, but retroactive application of the rule created a conflict with the time limit for temporary rules in ORS 183.335(6)(a). Clackamas Physical Therapy Associates*,
15 CCHR 208 (2010).
Temporary 436-009-0040 did not exceed the director's authority under ORS 656.248, but retroactive application of the rule created a conflict with the time limit for temporary rules in ORS 183.335(6)(a). Umpqua Valley Physical Therapy*,
15 CCHR 186 (2010).
Temporary 436-009-0040 did not exceed the director's authority under ORS 656.248, but retroactive application of the rule created a conflict with the time limit for temporary rules in ORS 183.335(6)(a). Hood River Physical Therapy*,
15 CCHR 196 (2010).
Temporary 436-009-0040 did not exceed the director's authority under ORS 656.248, but retroactive application of the rule created a conflict with the time limit for temporary rules in ORS 183.335(6)(a). Keizer Physical Therapy*,
15 CCHR 182 (2010).
Temporary 436-009-0040 did not exceed the director's authority under ORS 656.248, but retroactive application of the rule created a conflict with the time limit for temporary rules in ORS 183.335(6)(a). Tim Foley Physical Therapy*,
15 CCHR 178 (2010).
Temporary 436-009-0040 did not exceed the director's authority under ORS 656.248, but retroactive application of the rule created a conflict with the time limit for temporary rules in ORS 183.335(6)(a). Canby Physical Therapy*,
15 CCHR 174 (2010).
Temporary 436-009-0040 did not exceed the director's authority under ORS 656.248, but retroactive application of the rule created a conflict with the time limit for temporary rules in ORS 183.335(6)(a). Zomerschoe Physical Therapy*,
15 CCHR 169 (2010).
Temporary 436-009-0040 did not exceed the director's authority under ORS 656.248, but retroactive application of the rule created a conflict with the time limit for temporary rules in ORS 183.335(6)(a). Cascade Physical Therapy*,
15 CCHR 160 (2010).
Temporary 436-009-0040 did not exceed the director's authority under ORS 656.248, but retroactive application of the rule created a conflict with the time limit for temporary rules in ORS 183.335(6)(a). Laurelhurst Physical Therapy*,
15 CCHR 142 (2010).
Temporary 436-009-0040 did not exceed the director's authority under ORS 656.248, but retroactive application of the rule created a conflict with the time limit for temporary rules in ORS 183.335(6)(a). Chehalem Physical Therapy*,
15 CCHR 123 (2010).
Temporary 436-009-0040 did not exceed the director's authority under ORS 656.248, but retroactive application of the rule created a conflict with the time limit for temporary rules in ORS 183.335(6)(a). Therapeutic Associates, Inc.*,
15 CCHR 118 (2010).
Temporary 436-009-0040 did not exceed the director's authority under ORS 656.248, but retroactive application of the rule created a conflict with the time limit for temporary rules in ORS 183.335(6)(a). Erhardt Physical Therapy*,
15 CCHR 128 (2010).
Temporary 436-009-0040 did not exceed the director's authority under ORS 656.248, but retroactive application of the rule created a conflict with the time limit for temporary rules in ORS 183.335(6)(a). Impact Physical Therapy*,
15 CCHR 133 (2010).
Former OAR 436-009-0040(1), providing that an insurer must pay for medical services at the provider's usual fee or the fee schedule, was a valid rule that did not exceed the authority granted the director by ORS 656.248 to regulate payment of medical services. Chehalem Physical Therapy*,
15 CCHR 59 (2010).
OAR 436-120-0320(11), which requires that a worker be authorized to work in the U.S. to be eligible for vocational services, is valid. Torres, Jesus,
14 CCHR 105 (2009).
Promulgation of OAR 436-010-0220(2) does not exceed the director's rulemaking authority or impermissibly alter the meaning of the authorizing statute because the rule does not categorically render treatments non-compensable and furthermore the rule ensures that there is some coordination and review of all of the worker's treatments. Kraft, Ronald G.,
13 CCHR 289 (2008).
OAR 436-009-0035(7) explicitly stating that if a worker has no health benefit plan, the carrier is not required to pay for interim medical benefits is consistent with ORS 656.247 and does not exceed statutory authority. Keller, Tamara,
13 CCHR 85 (2008).
An administrative rule may not amend, alter, enlarge, or limit the terms of a statute. Carreon, Carmen*,
12 CCHR 160 (2007).
ORS 646.340 defines "worker" as any person including a minor whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, but OAR 436-120-0320 exceeds the statutory authority of the agency by requiring a worker to be authorized to work in the United States to be eligible for vocational services. Carreon, Carmen*,
12 CCHR 160 (2007).
OAR 436-010-0250 is within the director's authority under ORS 656.327 which charges the director with the duty to review medical treatment disputes and under ORS 656.726(4) the director may adopt procedural rules reasonably required to review disputes and reasonably related to the objectives of workers' compensation law. Moore, Patricia A,
11 CCHR 302 (2006).
A rule cannot impose a time limit that is absent from statute and if there is a conflict between a rule and a statute, the statute controls. Moore, Patricia A*,
11 CCHR 230 (2006).
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